

Surviving the Gales of Creative Destruction: The Determinants of Product Turnover

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ABSTRACT

Innovative industries are often characterized by rapid product turnover. Product longevity may be driven by both a product's position within a market as well as its position within a firm's larger product portfolio. However, we have little understanding of the relative importance of these factors in determining product turnover and how they interact as an industry evolves. Although researchers have invested substantial effort in analyzing *firm* survival and turnover, there are far fewer studies of the determinants of *product* survival and turnover. We use hazard rate models and count regression models to describe the behavior of firms and their products with a new and detailed database on the laser printer industry. We show, first, that competition and market structure variables have a large impact on both speeding product exit and delaying product entry. Second, there is some evidence that firms that have maintained a high market share for a number of years keep their products on the market longer than those with lower market share. Finally, firms with high innovative capacity tend to enter markets frequently, but withdraw their products at average rates. Firms with strong brands tend to introduce few products and withdraw their products slowly. With these findings, the paper links product entry and exit decisions to the broader literature on firm strategic and product management.

Keywords: Product Turnover; Innovation; Technology Strategy; Industry Dynamics

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I. INTRODUCTION

Innovative industries are often characterized by rapid product turnover. Product longevity may be driven by both a product's position within a market (i.e., by forces external to the firm that manufactures it) as well as its position within a firm's larger product portfolio (i.e., by internal strategic investment decisions). However, we have little understanding of the relative importance of these factors in determining product turnover and how they interact as an industry evolves.

Although researchers have invested substantial effort in analyzing *firm* survival and turnover (e.g. Hannan and Carroll 1993; Henderson 1995; Mitchell 1991, 1994; Tripsas 1997; Christensen 1997, 1998; Jovanovic 1982; Tushman and Anderson 1986; Ghemawat and Nalebuff 1985; Schumpeter 1942), there are far fewer studies of the determinants of *product* survival, despite the obvious role of products in firm profitability. Theoretical papers are especially scarce on this topic, and rarely consider both market forces and portfolio decisions simultaneously. Adner and Levinthal (2001) address how heterogeneity in consumer demand may influence the types of innovation firms undertake, and the nature of the products that result. However, their emphasis is on product introductions rather than product exit. Klepper and Thompson (2002) demonstrate that a very simple model in which firms make no strategic product development decisions can also explain many observed regularities of industry dynamics. Empirical work on product exit includes Sorenson (2000), who explores how the breadth of product portfolios affects firm survival rates in computer workstations, and Greenstein and Wade (1998) and

Stavins (1995), who estimate product survival rates for mainframes and personal computers, respectively. Like the last two papers, we explicitly model product exit, but in an industry in which there are multiple performance criteria or dimensions of innovation. In addition, this paper distinguishes between the external industry structure determinants of product survival and the role of portfolio considerations internal to the firm.

In analyzing product entry and exit decisions, this paper contributes to our understanding of how new technologies are adopted in broad product portfolios within firms, and in a competitive environment across firms. We exploit a new database on the laser printer industry, which we examine for a number of reasons. First, the performance of laser printers has consistently improved over time and can be easily observed. Second, we are able to track the entry and exit of nearly every product in the industry since its inception in 1984 through 1996. Third, the competitive environment varies across the product space and over time, providing some identification power. Fourth, there are heterogeneous firms of different sizes and with varied backgrounds. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the laser printer industry shares many characteristics with other high technology industries, such as personal and mainframe computers, disk drives, mobile phones, retail electronics, and the like. The products are differentiated; there is an innovation frontier; there is an important mass market; and product and firm turnover is prevalent. Like other industries, technical advances frequently give rise to market opportunities. The retirement of products occurs as firms introduce new innovations in their new models. These factors affect firms of all sizes, including both incumbents and entrants. Thus the insights from this study may be applicable to broad sectors of the economy.

We use hazard rate models and count regression models to describe the behavior of firms with respect to their product portfolios. We show, first, that market structure and competition variables have a large impact on both speeding product exit and delaying product entry. The number of products in the same product market niche, and in the market as a whole, significantly shortens the lives of products on the market, and can slow the entry of new products. Second, firms with more innovative capacity (as measured by patents) keep their products on the market just as long as their less innovative counterparts. However, these innovative firms introduce products more frequently.¹ Firms with strong brands, however, tend to introduce fewer products and keep those products on their market longer than their weak-brand counterparts. With this information, we develop a theory of product portfolio management to understand the product entry and exit decisions managers engage in. Finally, this paper also has some initial findings regarding the importance of two innovation frontiers for a product, a top frontier that is the traditional “make it better, faster” product innovation frontier, and a bottom frontier that is the “make it cheaper, accessible” frontier. These kind of dual frontiers probably exist in a number of industries, such as personal computers (with the Celeron), DVD players, automobiles, and digital TVs, to name just a few.² Investigating the micro-foundations of survival at the product level we believe, in the longer term, help us to understand the determinants of firm survival.

In the next section we state more concretely the hypotheses of the paper that we derive from the literature. A more formal treatment is provided in the Appendix. In the third section of this paper, we describe the desktop laser printer industry, and explain why it is a good arena in which to compare theories empirically. We describe our data and method in Section IV. In

¹ These results are also interesting in further elucidating the “Sony effect.” It is widely believed that innovative firms introduce new products onto the market and pull their older, yet profitable, predecessor products in a fast “churn” rate. This paper finds evidence of a different strategy.

Section V, we offer our empirical results. In Section VI, we provide some extensions, and we conclude in Section VII.

II. THEORY: WHY DO PRODUCTS EXIT MARKETS?

Product entry and exit decisions are governed, broadly speaking, by profit maximization and the strategic architecture necessary to achieve that objective. There are three main determinants of product exit. The first, external competitive pressure, drives uncompetitive products out of markets. Products exit due to very low sales. The second, lack of internal competitive advantage (capabilities, technology), results in relatively high costs of production or an inability to capture the value created by the firm. Products exit due to small margins. Finally, managers may choose to withdraw products as part of a portfolio strategy based on market conditions and the firm's innovative capabilities. Some managers may choose to pull successful products (in terms of sales and margins) from markets in order to make way for a new model; other managers may opt to leave the older, successful product on the market and not to invest in new product innovation; and others may elect to let the older and new product compete on the market. In this sense, product exit is not "failure," but part of a carefully honed strategy of the firm. In this section, we integrate a number of literatures to develop a framework for generating hypotheses about product exit, product entry, product portfolio decisions, and firm strategy. In the paper we provide a theoretical framework for understanding product exit decisions. This section is based on a more formal, yet simple model we develop in the Appendix to this paper.

We begin by noting that products should exit markets when marginal revenue is less than marginal cost. Because in a setting with differentiated products firms have some, but limited,

² In a very recent working paper employing the findings in this paper, Khessina and Carroll (2004) have found a similar pattern in the worldwide optical disk drive industry.

market power, the prevailing price for a product is determined by two factors. The first is the intensity of competition from the firm's own products (sometimes called cannibalization), which is a function of the focal firm's portfolio breadth, b . The second is the intensity of competition from other firms' products, which is a function of how many competing products are on the market, n .

We model the marginal cost as a function of the scale, or how many printers of a particular model are shipped, q ; the scope, or how many different models the firm makes (its product portfolio breadth) b ; and the firm's innovative capacity, i .

The profit a product generates for a firm (π) is equal to the price times the quantity minus the cost times the quantity. In its simplest form, a firm's strategy is to launch a product when it has a new model that results in positive profits ($\pi > 0$); the firm withdraws a product that is already on the market when that product starts generating negative profits ($\pi < 0$).

With this framework, we can now discuss product entry and exit decisions, product portfolio choices, and general strategies firms pursue. We begin by examining the issue of competition, embodied in the n variable. We assume that as competition increases, prices fall. Thus, the threshold condition for exit rises and the threshold condition for entry is less likely to be met as competition increases.

Thus, we can formalize this in our first set of hypotheses:

Competition Hypotheses:

H1: Exit is increasing in the amount of competition (n).

H2: Entry is decreasing in the amount of competition (n).

We also consider how costs are affected by quantity sold. In particular, if we assume there are scale economies in production and marketing which firms can effectively exploit for

cost advantages, then as the quantity firms sell increases, the cost per unit decreases. As firms increase production, they may achieve scale advantages (Stigler 1968), and may learn how to make products at lower cost (Teece et al 1997, Jovanovic and Lach 1989, Levinthal 1997, Abernathy and Utterback 1978, Klepper 1997). This suggests that $\frac{\partial c}{\partial q} < 0$. Because economies of scale decrease cost, for a given price a lower-cost product is more likely to survive, so the hazard of exit falls.

Scale Hypothesis

H3: Exit is decreasing in quantity of a product sold (q).

We now turn to the role of innovation in product entry and exit. Innovation can take the form of product innovation or process innovation. There are two possible effects we study here: the impact of product innovation on prices, and the impact of process innovation on costs. We argue that consumers are willing to pay for product innovations, so an innovative firm may command a higher price for its product. That is, $\frac{\partial p}{\partial i} > 0$. Process innovations allow firms to decrease costs of products directly through the production process, $\frac{\partial c}{\partial i} < 0$. Both effects imply that innovative products have a higher threshold for exit, because both increase the profitability of an individual product. We therefore expect that more innovative products to survive longer in the marketplace relative to their less innovative counterparts, *ceteris paribus*.

Innovation Hypothesis

H4: More innovative products will have lower exit rates.

While these first four hypotheses consider individual products, a more complex relationship exists for the firm within its product portfolio. In particular, in a multi-product firm, managers must struggle with the decision of how many products to offer. There are advantages and disadvantages to maintaining broad product lines. First, the broader the product line, the more demand segments and niches a firm can reach with its products in a market with heterogeneous consumers. Thus, the more products a firm maintains, the higher is the total quantity (summed over all its products) it sells. However, as the firm introduces more products, it faces competition not only from other firms' products, but also from its own. This is the cannibalization effect (see Schmalensee (1978) for a theoretical model and Greenstein and Wade (1998) for an empirical study of cannibalization). Competition from a firm's own products can either lower the price or reduce the market share of an individual product. That is, $\frac{\partial p}{\partial b} < 0$ or $\frac{\partial q}{\partial b} < 0$.

In addition, there may be either economies or diseconomies of scope associated with a broad product line. Having multiple products may allow firms to spread the costs out over a fixed infrastructure. But having multiple products may result in more complexity in management and production, and actually increase per-unit costs. We therefore have no priors on the sign of $\frac{\partial c}{\partial b}$.

The effect of changes in portfolio breadth on the overall profitability of the firm is thus unclear. However, we can analyze under what conditions we expect firm profits to increase in portfolio breadth. A more formal statement of this is provided in the Appendix. We find that if two conditions hold, then we may be able to identify the effect of product breadth on profits. If the impact of a firm's product breadth on the product price ($\frac{\partial p}{\partial b}$) is small, and the firm is able

to achieve large economies of scope, then profits can increase in product breadth. Thus, we want to know which firms are least likely to lower prices in the face of cannibalizing products, and which firms are most likely to achieve economies of scope.

We argue these conditions are most likely to occur for firms with strong product brands. The marketing literature on brand extension provides some evidence for this argument.³ This work suggests that the impact of product breadth on product prices is smallest for these types of firms. For example, Randall, Ulrich, Reibstein (1998), Rangaswamy, Burke and Oliva (1993), and Aaker (1991) show that firms with strong brands, measured as high brand equity⁴, are able to capture higher price premia on brand extensions into nearby product classes than are those firms without such strong brands.⁵ In addition, Reddy, Holak and Bhat (1994) find that strong brand firms are able to conduct product line extensions with limited cannibalization effects. Strong brand firms are also likely to have more economies of scope (or less diseconomies of scope) than weak brand firms. This advantage stems from two sources on the cost side. First, strong brand firms, when extending their portfolio breadth, usually can spend less on advertising per product than those with weaker brands. This occurs because the high brand equity built up in the focal product spills over to the new product, and a large infusion of advertising is not required to market the brand (as would occur with a weak brand product) (Agrawal 1996). Second, because the retail channel wishes to carry strong-branded products, these firms offering well-branded products can usually obtain shelf space and retailer promotion for a lower cost than weaker

³ The marketing literature on this topic is enormous. Here we identify some of the broad themes and cite only the tip of the iceberg on the given theme.

⁴ Keller (1993) has said that “a brand is said to have positive (negative) equity if consumers react more (less) favorably to the product, price, promotion, or distribution of the brand than they do to the same marketing mix element when it is attributed to a fictitiously named or unnamed version of the product or service.” That is, controlling for all other characteristics of the product, and changing only the brand, the advantage attributed to the product due only to brand is considered its brand equity. Aaker (1991) has said that brand equity may manifest itself in price premiums, market share advantage, or reduced costs of introducing new products.

branded products, thus lowering the per-unit cost of each new product line extension (Rao 1991). It is for these reasons that we argue that cannibalization is less likely to affect companies with strong brands, and economies of scope are more likely to occur in firms with strong product brands.⁶

We now discuss firm strategies in the context of these conditions. Firms can pursue either a proliferation (high b) strategy, or a focused (low b) strategy. Figure 1 summarizes the predictions for product entry and exit resulting from these two strategies. We consider a firm that makes two decisions as part of its strategy: it may or may not launch a new product, and it may or may not withdraw an incumbent product. There are four cases to consider: (a) no enter, exit; (b) enter, exit; (c) no enter, no exit; and (d) enter, no exit. It is important to note from the outset, that in this product portfolio sense, a decision to exit does not necessarily mean that a product has “failed.” It merely means that a profit-maximizing manager has determined that the current product portfolio is not the profit-maximizing one, and that alterations need to be made.

The first case above (no enter, exit) results under two conditions. The firm may be close to leaving the market altogether, so that it introduces no additional products and withdraws its current product offerings. Alternatively, this strategy is consistent with a firm that has attempted product proliferation, and is now contracting to a focused strategy. We distinguish between these alternatives by including a variable for firm exit in the empirical analysis. We call this firm a Focused firm. The second case is one in which the firm withdraws the incumbent product, and replaces it with a more innovative product. This is because the firm believes that the replacement product will be more profitable than the incumbent product individually, or both

⁵ This literature also notes that when a firm with a strong brand tries to extend the brand to different types of products, they suffer a substantial loss in brand equity and price premia.

products together in the market. We call firms that pursue this strategy Innovators, because such firms are cycling through products at a high rate, relying on their innovative capacity to generate new products. The third case is one in which the firm chooses not to introduce a new product because the old product is more profitable than the potential new product and more profitable than having both products in the market together. We call a firm pursuing this strategy Stagnant, because the firm relies on its old products and does not introduce new products into its portfolio. In the final case the firm introduces a new product, but does not withdraw the incumbent product because the profit generated from having both products in the market exceeds that of a single product. We label firms adopting this approach Proliferators. Theories in the literature predict each of these different yet mutually exclusive cases under different assumptions about demand and cost structures (Lee and Tang (1997); Randall, Ulrich and Reibstein (1998); and Kekre and Srinivasan (1990)).

Now that we have these four potential product portfolio cases, we can consider how to link the earlier discussion on product portfolios with these four firm strategies. We ask what firm characteristics are likely to fit into each strategy. We note that Product Proliferators and Innovators are those with high innovative capacity to support their entry strategy. These fast innovators are likely to have high entry patterns, all else equal. Product Proliferators must have the ability to support multiple products on the market and have small price declines due to cannibalization. In essence, other things equal, the Stagnant Firms and Proliferators should be able to exploit economies of scope on the cost side, without suffering price cannibalization.

⁶ If scope economies occur in production, then a decrease in $\partial p / \partial b$ may be associated with a decrease in $\partial c / \partial b$. However, if scope economies occur downstream, as we describe in the these latter two points, then a decrease in $\partial p / \partial b$ may not be associated with a decrease in $\partial c / \partial b$.

Companies with broad portfolios are likely to have strong brands and distribution channels, so that they can spread the costs of multiple products across their infrastructure and marketing.

In Figure 1, we more clearly highlight these differences. We note that innovation should drive entry patterns, and that brands should drive exit patterns. Firms that are not innovators are less likely to enter than their more innovative counterparts; firms that have weak brands are unlikely to benefit from scope economies, and therefore are likely to exit their products sooner than their strong brand counterparts. We codify these two notions in the next hypotheses:

Product Portfolio Hypothesis

H5: Firms with high innovative capacity should be more likely to launch new products than firms with lower innovative capacity.

H6: Firms with strong brands should be less likely to withdraw their products than weaker brand firms.

III. THE LASER PRINTER INDUSTRY

As the personal computer market expanded in 1980s, so too did the market for desktop printers. Hewlett-Packard introduced the first desktop laser printer for the retail market in 1984. By the end of 1985, 17 firms had introduced 23 models of printers. Figure 2 illustrates the number of firms and models in the industry from the beginning of the industry in 1984 to 1996.⁷ At its peak in 1990, the industry had 100 firms. Since that time, the number of firms has fallen off to 87.

Three types of firms populate the industry. Ricoh, IBM, Hewlett Packard, Canon, and Xerox are examples of large, diversified firms with a strong presence. A number of medium-sized firms specialize in multiple printer technologies, such as Lexmark, Kyocera, Genicom, and Kentek. Finally, there are over 100 very small “fringe” firms, which each produce few printer

models, ship very few units, and tend to appear in the industry only briefly. Hewlett Packard is the dominant firm in the industry, and has maintained between 45% and 65% market share for most of the industry's history. Table 1 documents the concentration ratios of the top 1, 5, and 10 firms in the industry (noted as the C1, C5, and C10 ratios, respectively).⁸ Defining a dominant firm as one that has ever been among the top 10 in market share, we find that dominant firms account for between 87% and 100% (in early years) of the market share in a given year, but they account for only 30-45% of the product models introduced.

We treat each printer with a unique model number as a distinct product whose features do not change after introduction.⁹ The number of products on the market has generally been increasing over time, as seen in Figure 2, with a peak at 633 product models in 1996. Figure 3 shows product entry and exit by year. The rate of entry peaked in 1990.¹⁰ Figures 2 and 3 together suggest that a smaller number of firms are offering more diversified product portfolios. The average number of products per firm was 8.8 in 1996, up from 1.8 in 1988.¹¹ We explore this result further in the econometric analyses.

IV. DATA AND METHOD

A. SOURCE OF THE DATA

⁷ In 1996, multifunction printers entered the market. This could be considered a radical or "converging" innovation. To avoid mixing incremental innovations with radical ones, we consider only the period through 1996.

⁸ The quantity data we possess seem to be sufficiently good to make determinations about the largest firms in the industry. Unfortunately, the coverage of fringe firms and individual models is poor.

⁹ Unlike some product markets, firms in this industry do not change printer attributes once the product has been introduced. Rather, they introduce new products.

¹⁰ This is likely because it was about this time that the home office laser printer market was being developed, and new innovations were coming about to address this fast growing market niche.

¹¹ In defining the industry, we appealed to the data and to industry experts and trade journals. These sources consistently define the desktop laser printer industry as laser printers that print 0-12 PPM, can be attached to a personal computer, and are small enough to fit on a desk. This industry definition has remained constant over the time period. Our statistical analyses are robust to small definitional changes.

The information on laser printer characteristics, entry, and exit come from a variety of sources. The primary source is Dataquest's SpecCheck analysis of page printers. Dataquest follows each manufacturer's products and records a variety of product characteristics, including ship date, speed, resolution, and other features. The data were incomplete for many models, so we supplemented this data with information from trade journals, private analysts' reports, and general industry data provided to us by a private consulting firm. We believe the dataset, which covers the industry from its inception in 1984 to 1996, is the most comprehensive available. Over this 13-year period, we are able to record 2,835 printer-year observations. We restrict the analysis to data from 1986-1996, because too few models were introduced in the early years of the industry to permit identification of the econometric models. Though we have attempted to be as thorough as possible, there remain some printers for which we cannot identify all of the independent variables. These have been dropped from the analysis. To identify patterns of innovation we rely on the MicroPatent database, which provided application dates for patents granted in the industry. We limit our analysis to the most relevant patents for the industry come from four patent classes: 271 (sheet feeding and delivering), 355 (photocopying), 359 (optics), and 399 (electrophotography).¹²

B. PATTERNS IN THE DATA

We begin by examining patterns in the data to describe the industry. Although printers can be characterized on a number of dimensions, the two most common measures of printer performance are speed, measured by pages per minute (PPM), and resolution, measured by dots

¹² Given the size of some of the firms (such as IBM), it is also likely that some firms might have patents that cover products other than laser printers. To the extent this is true, it would create noise in the measure, and thus probably bias the coefficient to zero. Nevertheless, it would likely still be a good measure of innovativeness in imaging technology, which would be a good measure of the capability in this domain.

per inch (DPI). Printers are bunched tightly in groups in the performance space. Figure 4 shows the distribution of printer models across the 20 discrete product classes (or niches) in terms of these two characteristics that we defined based on the clear groupings of printers.

Figures 5 and 6 are scatterplots of the distribution of resolution and speed over time, where each circle is a printer model. During the entire time period, firms improved upon printer resolution, while continuing to develop and introduce printers far behind the DPI frontier. In PPM space, however, a slightly different pattern holds. From 1986 to the early 1990s, firms were introducing printers that were faster as well as printers that were slower than existing products, creating a dual frontier. The cost of producing slower printers may have dropped faster than that of higher speed models, enabling easier entry into low-PPM classes. Alternatively, offering a range of speeds may enable firms to meet more consumers' heterogeneous preferences. This dual-frontier of innovation is a departure from most previous academic work, in which improvement along a single dimension is examined (Christensen 1997, Henderson 1995, Greenstein and Wade 1998).¹³

C. VARIABLE DEFINITIONS

We define a product exit as the first year that the product drops out of the dataset. This means that none of the sources reports the printer is being shipped to retailers from the manufacturers, although it may still be available in some retail outlets from inventory. If any one of the sources reports the printer is still being shipped, we record it as still on the market.

One alternative definition of product exit would be when sales reach zero. Unfortunately, the best data available from a private company on the quantity of models shipped by

¹³ This pattern, however, is consistent with Porter (1985). The lower frontier firms are pursuing a "low cost" strategy while the upper frontier firms are pursuing a "differentiation" strategy.

manufacturers have poor coverage or do not record units sold for low volume models or for models of smaller vendors.¹⁴ These data do seem to be realistic at the aggregate sales level for individual product niches and for large firms, but the precision may still be suspect. As extensions to the main regressions, we re-estimate our models using the quantity data in Section VI.

The independent variables are grouped into four categories and defined in Table 2. Product characteristic variables include MODEL AGE, DPI, PPM, POSTSCRIPT, HPPCL, MODEL AWARD, and PRICE. Firm characteristics are captured by DOMINANT FIRM, PUBLIC FIRM, FORTUNE 1000, OWN ALL MODELS, OWN NICHE MODELS, and PATENTS. We also include fixed effects for specific firms as noted later in the paper. TOTAL MODELS, SAME NICHE, and SAME DPI/PPM are measures of market structure. PC SALES and INK JET PRICE proxy for the impact of complements and substitutes. In the entry regressions, we include a measure of product development cost, the average wage of a Level 4 engineer as defined by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (WAGE). Finally, LAG OF ENTRY is the lag of the count of products of a firm's entry in the niche.

The descriptive statistics are found in Table 3. The average product stays on the market for three years, and costs almost \$2,200. The most prevalent standard is HP-PCL, in 82% of printers, followed by Postscript (a proprietary Adobe standard) in 46% of printers. Although the average printer has increased its resolution, the average speed of the printers has remained constant from the beginning of the industry, consistent with our earlier discussion on the two-edged frontier of innovation. The average number of products per niche is 19.

¹⁴ Greenstein and Wade find similar problems with the IDC data in mainframe computing (1998: p. 779, fn 13-15).

D. METHOD

We use an exponential hazard rate specification to examine the determinants of product exit over the product life cycle. The flexibility of this method in accounting for censoring, as well as time variant and time invariant independent variables, makes it attractive to study product failure.

In this specification, the individual model is the unit of analysis. The likelihood function for any given observation, i , can be written as:

$$L_i = G_i(t_i)[\mu_i(t)]^\phi$$

where $G_i(t)$ is the survivor function, $\mu_i(t)$ is the hazard rate, ϕ is a variable that is one for uncensored cases and zero otherwise, and t_i is the number of periods that product i is in the market (Tuma and Hannan 1984). We assume a constant hazard rate of $\mu(t) = \gamma$ (the exponential distribution). The survivor function is then $G(t) = \exp[-\gamma t]$. The following specification is used:

$$\mu(t) = \exp[X(t)\alpha(t)]$$

where $\mu(t)$ is the instantaneous hazard rate for a system at time t and $X(t)$ is a vector of time-varying independent variables. Each $\exp[X(t)\alpha]$ can be thought of as multipliers of the hazard rate, and α can be estimated using maximum likelihood techniques (Carroll 1983, Tuma and Hannan 1984). Because we have data from the beginning of the industry, left censoring is not a

problem. We omit all observations for products that were introduced before 1986 (the first year of the econometrics). The estimation procedure accounts for right censoring.

To examine entry, we consider a count model. In this analysis, each observation is a firm-niche-year observation, and the dependent variable is the count of products introduced by the firm in a given niche-year. Once a firm has entered the market, a firm becomes at risk for entry into any niche, and it remains at risk for all time periods that it still has a printer on the market.¹⁵

To estimate these equations, we begin with the assumption that the count variables are Poisson distributed. Unfortunately, specification tests (Cameron and Trivedi 1986) indicate there is overdispersion in the data. Overdispersion occurs when the Poisson model assumption that the conditional mean of the event counts equals the variance is violated. We therefore estimate the model negative binomial regressions, which allows for overdispersion. It sets the condition mean at $E(y_i | x_i) = u_i = \exp[x_i\beta]$, but allows the variance to take the form $V(y_i | x_i) = (1 + \alpha)u_i$. Each of the parameters of $(\exp[x_i\beta])$ can be thought of as multipliers of the rate of product introduction.

E. IMPLEMENTING THE HYPOTHESES

Table 4 lists the hypotheses described in Section III and the expected sign of the coefficients of variables that relate to them. The first and second hypotheses predict that intense competition results in higher product exit rates, so we expect increases in TOTAL MODELS and SAME NICHE to increase the exit rates of products, and TOTAL MODELS and SAME NICHE to deter potential entrants. This would suggest that that in the exit regressions, we should see

higher hazard rates attributable to increases in TOTAL MODELS and SAME NICHE, while in the entry analysis, we should see lower entry rates attributable to these variables.¹⁶

The third hypothesis predicts that the products of firms with a lower cost position will have a lower probability of product exit. While we do not possess precise data on the number of units sold by product model, we do have reasonable data on the market share of the firm. DOMINANT IN YEAR status, which indicates a firm that has high unit sales, should be associated with a lower hazard rate if economies of scale exist. However, because market share position could be an indication of either lower cost position or market power, our test will only allow us to reject the cost hypothesis, not to differentiate between cost and market power explanations.

The fourth hypothesis predicts managers will withdraw less innovative products from the market before they withdraw more innovative products. This would suggest negative coefficients on PPM and DPI. However, as noted earlier, innovative products will be on both frontiers in the PPM space. Thus the relationship between survival and PPM in this industry (and industries like it) will be nonlinear and non-monotonic. We expect to see greater survival rates on both frontiers. PPM should increase the hazard rate and PPM-squared should have a negative coefficient if both frontiers have higher survival prospects.

In order to examine the product portfolio hypothesis, we use a number of variables.¹⁷ We begin with the effect of innovation on product entry decisions as outlined in Hypothesis 5. We

¹⁵ We have coded the data in this way because we believe that the decision to enter the market at all is fundamentally different than a decision to continue in the marketplace.

¹⁶ If there is competition from neighboring niches, we would expect increases in SAME PPM and SAME DPI to increase the hazard rate as well.

¹⁷ Given Hypotheses 5 and 6 involve endogenous managerial decision-making—product exit and product entry—one would want a structural model that involves estimating a hazard rate model for product exit and a dichotomous dependent variable model for product entry. This would require that the hazard rate model have an endogenous variable on the right hand side. However, in general, the coefficient estimates from such an estimation procedure are inconsistent (Hausman 2001). There is not a hazard rate model method that has been developed that generates

use PATENTS to measure the innovative activity of the firm. Hypothesis 5 suggests that firms with more innovative capacity should be more likely to enter. Thus, in the entry regressions, we should see a multiplier of greater than one on the PATENTS variable if this theory holds.¹⁸

We now turn to Hypothesis 6. This states that firms with strong brands should be less likely to withdraw their products. We include dummy variables for product made by firms with the strongest laser printer brands: HP, IBM, DEC, XEROX, and CANON.¹⁹ If brands provide products “staying power” on the market, then the multiplier on these variables should be less than one and statistically significant in the hazard rate models, consistent with Hypothesis 6. Table 4 summarizes the predictions and tests of the hypotheses.

We also include a number of additional variables to control for different organizational structures, unobserved demand, and unobserved product quality. REBRAND is a dummy variable equal to one if the product is made by an original equipment manufacturer and then rebranded. ENGINE MANUFACTURER is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm also makes laser engines.²⁰ OWN ALL MODELS controls for the number of models the firm has on

unbiased estimates of such models of which we are aware. Development of these empirical methods is beyond the scope of this paper. Rather than test these hypotheses in a structural way, we will attempt to describe some of the patterns of behavior that occur in this industry that may be consistent or inconsistent with the hypotheses, though this approach does not constitute a “test” of the hypotheses.

¹⁸ We have no strong priors about the way firms behave with respect to product exit. If firms are Innovators, they may choose to exit their products more quickly. However, if they are Product Proliferators, they will withdraw their products at the same rate as their less-innovative counterparts. The expectation is that the coefficient on PATENTS in hazard rate models should not be negative. However, both a statistically significant positive coefficient and a statistically insignificant coefficient are consistent with the theory.

¹⁹ These brands were selected on the following basis. First, we looked at advertising intensity. A large number of firms appeared with high advertising intensity. However, because many of the firms in our dataset are private, we are unable to obtain their advertising intensity. We then conducted interviews with 6 independent analysts and company managers. They listed these five companies as having the strongest downstream laser printer brands. Here, “strong brand” was defined as the highest customer recognition associated with laser printers. There were many other companies with strong brands in other product markets (e.g. Minolta, Seiko, Nikon, Fujitsu), but these were regarded as not having high brand recognition in laser printers. Finally, we examined PC Magazine review of printers and found that these companies appeared in every annual printer review in the year in which they sold printers.

²⁰ Some manufacturers of laser printers are backward integrated into laser engine manufacturing, which may affect their behavior in the downstream printer market (de Figueiredo and Teece 1996). In particular, they may be less

the market at the same time as the focal model. PC SALES and INK JET PRICE proxy for demand for complements and substitutes, respectively. MODEL AWARD is a dummy variable equal to one if the printer received an editor's choice award from PC Magazine; FIRM AWARD is equal to one if any of a firm's products received such an award. Finally, HEDONIC RESIDUAL is difference between a product's actual suggested retail price and that predicted by a hedonic price equation.²¹

V. RESULTS

A. EXIT

We present seven models in Table 5.²² The first number next to each variable name is the hazard ratio (or multiplier of the hazard rate). A value of less than one indicates that an increase in the variable lowers the hazard rate (and would be equivalent to a negative coefficient); a value of more than one indicates that an increase in the variable raises the hazard rate (and would be equivalent to a positive coefficient). The robust standard errors are presented in parentheses below the hazard ratios. The significance is shown for two-tailed t-tests at the 99%, 95% and 90% significance levels.

Model 1 presents results from a specification that includes variables related to age (MODEL AGE, TIME TREND), product characteristics (POSTSCRIPT, HP-PCL, MODEL AWARD, DPI, PPM, PPM-squared, PRICE), and firm characteristics (FIRM AWARD, OWN ALL MODELS, OWN NICHE MODELS). Model 2 adds the market structure variables. In

likely to have product turnover because they are tied to their own laser engines. We include a dummy variable, ENGINE MANUFACTURER, to control for such firms.

²¹ HEDONIC RESIDUAL is the residual from a hedonic price equation, and is the difference between the product's predicted and actual prices. A high price, for example, could indicate a high cost structure, or unobserved quality that merits a price premium (Stavins 1995). Results of this econometric analysis are available from the authors.

²² The results we present are robust to the exclusion of HP printers.

Model 3, we include the additional innovation variables. Model 4 adds REPLACEMENT, a variable equal to 1 if the firm introduced a product into the same product niche at the same time it withdrew a product and 0 otherwise. Given that the entry decision is endogenous to the exit decision (as noted in the previous section), we include this specification cautiously, mainly as a discussion point, rather than to provide any structural interpretation of the relationship between entry and exit.

Across the four models, most coefficient estimates are remarkably stable in both their magnitude and statistical significance. A likelihood ratio test indicates Models 2 through 4 have equivalent explanatory power at the 95% level as Model 2. Model 2 outperforms Model 1. Hence, we continue our discussion of the results with reference to Models 2-4.

We now turn to our four hypotheses that relate to exit: H1, H3, H4, and H6. The first hypothesis predicts that competition increases a product's hazard rate. We find very strong evidence for this hypothesis. The multipliers on both TOTAL MODELS and SAME NICHE are greater than one and statistically significant. In addition, the multiplier on SAME NICHE² is less than one and also statistically significant, indicating that the effect of SAME NICHE on product exit is nonlinear and concave. The magnitude of the estimated coefficients implies that an additional product in a niche increases the probability of exit by about 9%. Competition in neighboring product niches (SAME PPM, SAME DPI) actually decreases the probability of product exit in the focal class by 0.6% to 1.0%. This interesting result might be because neighboring niches don't compete with focal niches, but advertising externalities may accrue to products in the same speed and resolution niches. It may also be evidence that firms successfully use product differentiation to soften competition. Alternatively, the effect of neighboring competition may not be separately identified from total and same niche measures.

The third hypothesis examines the effect of scale on product survival. We test this using a measure of firm market share, DOMINANT IN YEAR.²³ The coefficient on this variable is statistically significant at the 95% level of confidence. A firm that is in the top 10 in market share in a given year decreases the probability of exit of its product by about 30%. Thus, there is some evidence to suggest that scale economies increase product survival, but these results cannot be differentiated from market power explanations. Thus, as noted earlier, we interpret this result as meaning we cannot reject H3.

Hypothesis 4 addresses whether more innovative products last longer on the market. Printers on the frontier of resolution, or DPI, survive longer on the market than less advanced products. The effect of printer speed is less straightforward. While the magnitudes of the multipliers of PPM and PPM² are consistent with our hypothesis that proximity to either the high-end or low-end frontier slows exit, neither coefficient is statistically significant.

Hypothesis 6 states that firms with strong brands are less likely to withdraw their products. To test this, we created dummy variables for the five companies with strong consumer brands in the United States: HP, IBM, DEC, Xerox, and Canon. The multiplier on each of these dummy variables is less than one, as expected. Two have statistically significant coefficients, and the five coefficients are jointly statistically different from zero at the 90% level of confidence (by a Wald test). Together, these results suggest that firms with strong brands are less likely to withdraw their products from markets than are firms without strong brands.

In Model 4, we examine REPLACEMENT, subject to earlier caveats. We would like to know if a company withdraws a product at the same time it introduces a new one. The coefficient on REPLACEMENT is less than one, but not statistically significant, suggesting exit

²³ We recognize that this could be measuring market power or lower cost position, and proceed with our interpretation of the results with this in mind.

is not more likely when a firm introduces an additional product into the same niche. However, this result, because of the potential endogeneity of the variable, must be viewed cautiously. We discuss this further in the next section.

Finally, we turn to the control variables. Older products are more likely to be withdrawn relative to newer products. Each passing year increases the probability of withdrawing a product from the market by 22%. PC sales decrease the hazard rates for printers. This suggests that sales of complementary products have a large impact on the product withdrawal patterns of desktop laser printers. The hazard ratio of OWN ALL MODELS is greater than one, implying an increase in the probability that a given product exits by 2.5%, and is statistically significant in every specification. Printers that win awards stay on the market longer. The coefficient on MODEL AWARD means that printers that have won awards in the past have a 23% lower hazard rate than those printers that do not win awards. Finally, the coefficient on the residual from the hedonic pricing equation is much greater than one, and statistically significant, suggesting the unobservable qualities that generate a “high price” are probably due to higher cost, rather than higher quality (in contrast to Stavins 1995).

Overall, we find substantial support for (or cannot reject) H1, H3, and H6. We find that on single-frontier technological trajectory (DPI), there is support for H4, but this does not carry over to dual-frontier technological trajectories (PPM) in a statistically significant way. Competition has a large effect in shortening the longevity of products on the market. Firm characteristics, such as market share, seem to play a moderate role in extending the life of products. Indeed, companies with strong brands do have much lower exit rates than those

without strong brands. However, a firm's innovative capacity, as reflected in its patent portfolio, has no statistically significant impact on product withdrawal behavior.²⁴

B. ENTRY

In this subsection, we analyze the evidence for Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 5, which state that competition and innovation affect entry patterns. Table 6 displays the entry regression results. Model 7 presents the entry model without the patent variable, Model 8 includes the patent variable, and Model 9 offers a model with year and class fixed effects. All models cluster standard errors by firm. The incidence ratio or multiplier is presented with its robust standard error beneath in parentheses. If the multiplier is more than one, an increase in the variable by one unit is associated with an increase in the number of product introductions (like a positive coefficient); numbers less than one mean fewer product introductions (like a negative coefficient). All coefficients are marked for statistical significance on two tailed asymptotic t-tests.²⁵ In all models, a large number of the coefficients are statistically significant and signed as expected. Here we describe some of the more interesting results.

Firms that win awards introduce 96% more products than firm that do not. Competition (SAME NICHE) has a multiplier greater than one that is statistically significant and SAME NICHE² has a multiplier less than one that is statistically significant. However, the presence of many products in a niche may also reflect high demand in that niche, which we do not directly observe. We therefore include NICHE DEMAND in Model 10 as a variable. The coefficient is

²⁴ These results are robust to separate regressions for core (i.e., large market share) and fringe firms. Although the coefficients are similar in these additional regressions, it is important to note that it is not the case that core and fringe firms necessarily pursue the same strategies. This is because the means of the independent variables differs for the two groups. What this ancillary analysis suggests is that innovation and branding affect both core firms' and fringe firms' product exit strategies on the margin similarly.

²⁵ In specifications not reported here, we included variables for substitutes (ink jet prices), but were unable to disentangle these effects from the wage effects.

greater than one and statistically significant as they predict, and the coefficient on SAME NICHE declines substantially. Though it is still above one and statistically significant, the combined effect of SAME NICHE and its square is negative if the niche has more than 30 products. This suggests that competition deters additional entry in the case of very crowded markets, providing some support for Hypothesis 2.

The innovation variable, PATENTS, which is the focus of Hypothesis 5, has a statistically significant coefficient that is greater than one in all of the models. This suggests that firms with greater innovative capacity have a higher incidence of entry than those without this innovative capacity. Every ten new patents in the key patent classes corresponds to a 0.5% increase in the rate of entry. The product entry rates would be approximately 45% greater for the average innovator with 291 patents in the relevant patent classes than a firm with none. This result is consistent with Hypotheses 5.

Finally, we find that companies with strong brands enter with a lower incidence than those with weaker brands. After controlling for numerous firm characteristics (patents, previous entry behavior, market share, awards won, and engines manufacturing), the models show that four of the five company dummy variables have statistically significant coefficients that are negative, and the five are jointly significant at the 99% confidence level.²⁶ Taken together, the exit analysis and the entry analysis are consistent with the predictions outlined in Figure 1. While not a test of this hypothesis, the results we provide suggest that future research, with more sophisticated methods yet to be developed, might find it useful to explore Hypotheses 5 and 6.

²⁶ Only HP has a positive coefficient, and this is not statistically significant. A chi-square test finds the coefficients on these variables are jointly significant at the 99% level.

VI. REFINEMENTS AND EXTENSIONS

In this section, we introduce four refinements to the empirical work that explore the importance of innovation, cannibalization, cost, and competition in determining product turnover rates. The first refinement examines demand. It is reasonable to expect that in product niches where there is strong (and perhaps growing) demand, products that have high cost, high price, or poor quality may survive longer than similar products that are in niches with low demand or slowing growth. To examine this possibility, we include in the hazard rate model a variable called NICHE DEMAND, which is the number of units sold in the product niche in that year. Earlier in the paper, we noted the questionable quality of this measure, but we include it in Model 5 of Table 5 in the hope that even a crude indicator might be useful. Model 5 illustrates that the coefficient on NICHE DEMAND is less than one, as expected, and statistically significant at the 99% level, so we can conclude that higher demand in a niche increases survival.

The second refinement examines aftermarkets, or the market for a complementary product. One concern that may arise in this particular industry is that strategies in the laser toner market (aftermarket) may affect the results of product longevity in the printer market (foremarket). In particular, firms that make substantial profits in the toner cartridge market may choose to extend the life of their printers to reap a continued profit stream. There is no theory we are aware of on exactly this point. However, Emch (2003) has demonstrated theoretically, with specific reference to the laser toner business, that the incentive to mark-up toner should increase with the size of installed base of printers. (This is called the “opportunism” effect in the economics literature on aftermarkets.) Empirically, though, Emch (2001) finds *no evidence of excessive mark-ups in the laser toner market because of this opportunism effect*. While not

directly addressing the question of product longevity, this previous study suggests that there may not be a channeling affect of the price of toner on product survival rates.²⁷

In addition to this previous evidence, we attempt to control for this effect at the firm level by examining the effect of installed base on product longevity. In Model 6, we include a variable on the size of the installed base for a given firm, defined as the number of printers sold by the firm over the past three years.²⁸ If, as suggested previously, the higher the installed base leads to greater aftermarket incentive to profit from toner cartridges and thus greater longevity for the printer, the predicted hazard ratio should be less than one. While the coefficient on INSTALLED BASE is less than one, it is not statistically significant at conventional levels.

Third, a potential complication in interpreting our results is that our analysis does not distinguish between products withdrawn by surviving firms and those that exit the market because the firm has failed. We cannot include a dummy variable for firm exit in the hazard rate regression because firm exit perfectly predicts product exit. The results from hazard model using only observations from surviving firms are quite similar to the results obtained from the full sample, since 1,200 of the observations correspond to surviving firms. Table 7 compares the characteristics of these firms with those that fail. Surviving firms have 5 times more patents in the relevant patent classes, on average, than exiting firms. These “good” firms have won 8 times the number of product awards, have 3 times bigger product lines, and have higher market share. So while there are substantial differences in firm characteristics, the results in Models 1-4 overwhelmingly reflect the portfolio decisions of surviving firms rather the effects of firm failures.

²⁷ Emch (2003) also explores the effect of price discrimination on proprietary aftermarkets. He shows that as foremarket competition increases, markups in the aftermarket drop to zero (before markups in the foremarket do). He uses the laser printer – laser toner market as an example of this behavior.

²⁸ Recall that the sales data at the model level is poor and insufficient to carry out this analysis on the model level.

Finally, there is a burgeoning literature on platform competition which may raise the question as to whether platform exit affects product exit (see for example, Cusumano and Gawer 2002, Jones 2003). To analyze this question statistically, one cannot merely put a platform variable on the right hand side of the regression equation and examine its effect, because platform exit will perfectly predict model exit. However, we can analyze as our dependent variable the likelihood of the platform exiting, and then ask if the same factors that affect product exit also affect platform exit. We are fortunate to have data on laser engines which, as noted earlier, serve as the platform on which laser printers are built. We define a platform exit as that time when the laser engine model exits the firm's portfolio of laser engines. We eliminate all exits where there is only one laser printer using that laser engine, and then re-run the analysis. These preliminary results show, consistent with expectations of the previous literature on platforms, that platforms have greater staying power on the market than the individual products. In fact, firms that win awards for their printers tend to keep the platform (though they may exit the printer) longer than those firms who do not such awards. Platforms are also more insulated from competition (as measured by the market structure variables) than are printer models. Finally, strong branded firms are less likely to exit platform models than are firms with weaker brands, consistent with the finding for printer models.

VII. CONCLUSION

This paper empirically examines product exit and entry in the laser printer industry. This is a turbulent market, displaying frequent product turnover in the face of new technical opportunities. In this sense, it looks like a number of other markets that exhibit frequent product introductions and terminations. Like many young industries, it also contains an interesting

expansion in the product space over time and expansion in the degree of competition over time. These patterns frame many interesting questions about the rate of product turnover. Moreover, this is largely unexamined by empirical work, and not well understood in any market.

The paper offers evidence that competition and market structure are strong drivers in determining the longevity of products on the market. In particular, we find evidence that competition both slows product entry (in crowded niches) and speeds product exit. This result is consistent with the external competitive pressure explanations of product survival and turnover. In addition, we find that firms with large market shares are less likely to withdraw their products than those with small market shares. Third, we find evidence that products on some of the technological frontiers have lower hazard rates than products behind the frontier. In addition, we demonstrate that in this industry (and likely similar industries) there are actually two frontiers of innovation, and little research has been devoted to understanding the competitive dynamics of the lower frontier.

Perhaps the most substantial finding of this paper is with respect to product portfolio strategies. Figure 7 summarizes the findings of this paper. We find that the innovative capability of the firm, as reflected in its stock of knowledge (measured by relevant patents) increases the incidence of entry. However, innovative capacity seems to have no effect on product withdrawals. Companies with strong laser printer brands, on the other hand, have lower incidence of entry, and also have lower hazard rates of product exit than other firms. The relationship between brands and product entry was not anticipated by our theory. What happens when a firm is highly innovative and has a strong brand? These types of firms have lower exit rates for their products. However, the effects of brands and patents on product entry operate in opposite directions. It is an empirical question as to which dominates. We have calculated this

effect for a number of firms and we find that innovation effect swamps the brand effect when it comes to entry. That is, firms which are both innovative and have strong brands have high incidence of entry, and low rates of product exit. It is these types of firms that are product proliferators. They introduce new products and do not withdraw the older models. This result is also consistent with an extensive literature on product proliferation in differentiated product space to block entry (e.g. Schmalensee 1978, Scherer 1982) and with the marketing literature on brand extension. Note, however, that our work suggests that if academics are to understand this product entry and exit phenomenon, we must examine both horizontal differentiation (brands) and vertical differentiation (innovation) together. As noted in the introduction, other high technology industries, such as personal and mainframe computers, disk drives, fax machines, and retail electronics, where innovation and brands come together in the consumer's purchase decision, are likely to exhibit many of the same effects we see here.

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APPENDIX
A MORE FORMAL TREATMENT OF THE THEORETICAL SECTION

We assume firms maximize profit. For each product, the profit that is generated is:

$$\pi = p(n, b, i)q(b) - c(q(b), b, i)q(b) \quad \text{Eq (1)}$$

The profit a product generates for a firm (π) is equal to the price times the quantity (i.e. revenue) minus the unit cost times the quantity. The first term is the revenue, which is equal to the price $p(n, b, i)$ times the quantity $q(b)$. As noted above, the price is affected by the number of competitor products on the market (n) and the number of the firm's own products on the market (b). The quantity the firm sells is related to the product breadth (or number of products in its product portfolio). The second term is the cost per unit, $c(q(b), b, i)$, times the quantity, $q(b)$. Again, the cost is dependent upon quantity sold (q), the breadth of the product line (b), and the innovativeness of the firm (i).

We assume that as competition increases, prices fall. In terms of our profit equation, that would be $\frac{\partial p}{\partial n} < 0$. Thus, the threshold condition for exit rises and the threshold condition for entry is less likely to be met as competition increases. This is the basis for H1 and H2.

We assume there are scale economies in production and marketing which firms can effectively exploit for cost advantages, then as the quantity firms sell increases, the cost per unit decreases. From our profit equation, this suggests that $\frac{\partial c}{\partial q} < 0$. Because economies of scale decrease cost, for a given price a lower-cost product is more likely to survive, so the hazard of exit falls. This is the basis for H3.

We now turn to the role of innovation in product entry and exit, manifested in the profit equation with the variable i . If innovativeness of the product increases consumers' willingness to pay for a product, product innovations allow a firm to command a higher price for its product. Thus, in the profit equation, we note that $\frac{\partial p}{\partial i} > 0$. However, there is also a benefit to firms of process innovation in a single product. Process innovations allow firms to decrease costs of products directly through the production process, $\frac{\partial c}{\partial i} < 0$. Thus, innovation can either raise price or lower costs, *ceteris paribus*. This then means that innovative products have a higher threshold for exit. This is the basis for H4

There may be both advantages and disadvantages to maintaining broad product lines. First, the broader the product line, the more demand segments and niches a firm can reach with its products in a market with heterogeneous consumers. Thus, the more products a firm maintains, the higher the total quantity (sum of all its products) it is likely to sell, *ceteris paribus*. However, the broader the product line, the more the firm's products will compete with each other. That is, either $\frac{\partial p}{\partial b} < 0$ (from price competition) or $\frac{\partial q}{\partial b} < 0$ (from business stealing). Third, there may be either economies or diseconomies of scope. In our model, we note this effect as $\frac{\partial c}{\partial b}$, but have no theoretical prediction for its sign.

We attempt to identify how a change in product portfolio and product breadth affects the overall profitability of the firm. We take the first derivative of the profit equation to generate a first order condition yielding the following equation:

$$\frac{\partial \pi}{\partial b} = \left[\frac{\partial p}{\partial b} q(b) + p(n, b, i) \frac{\partial q}{\partial b} \right] - \left[\frac{\partial q}{\partial b} \frac{\partial c}{\partial b} q(b) + c(q(b), b, i) \frac{\partial q}{\partial b} \right] \quad \text{Eq (2)}$$


$$\begin{aligned} & [(-) (+) + (+) (+)] - [(+) (?) (+) + (+) (+)] \\ & [(-) + (+)] - [(?) + (+)] \end{aligned}$$

Although seemingly messy, we have indicated the sign of each term below the equation. What becomes evident from this analysis is that there is no easy solution as to whether a large product portfolio will enhance the profitability of a firm or cause it to be unprofitable. This is because the sign of the first derivative is indeterminate, and depends upon the magnitudes of the partial derivatives.

What we can analyze, however, is what is likely to drive a firm to higher profits. As we can see from Equation 2, if $\frac{\partial p}{\partial b}$ is small, then the first term becomes positive. Also, if a firm is able to achieve sufficiently large economies of scope, then the second term is no longer indeterminate, but is positive ($\frac{\partial c}{\partial b} > 0$). This is the basis for H5 and H6.

Figure 1: Product Portfolio Hypotheses

H6: Strong Brand



No Exit

Old Product

Exit

H5: High Innovation



New Product

No Enter

Enter

<p>0 > π^D, π^N, π^O</p> <p>Dying or Focus</p>	<p>$\pi^O > \pi^D, \pi^N$</p> <p>Stagnant</p>
<p>$\pi^N > \pi^D, \pi^O$</p> <p>Innovator</p>	<p>$\pi^D > \pi^N, \pi^O$</p> <p>Product Proliferation</p>

π^D = profit of both products in market together
 π^N = profit of new product when alone in market
 π^O = profit of old product when alone in market

Figure 2: Number of Firms and Products in Marketplace




Figure 3: Product Entry and Exit





Figure 4: Product Distribution and Classes



Note: Each small circle represents a printer.

Figure 5: DPI by Model




Figure 6: PPM by model




Figure 7: Summary of Product Portfolio Findings

		Firm Strong Brand?	
		No	Yes
Innovative Firm?	No	Entry: Average Exit: Average Stagnator	Entry: Low Exit: Slow Marketer
	Yes	Entry: High Exit: Average Innovator	Entry: High Exit: Slow Product Proliferator

TABLE 1A: CONCENTRATION RATIOS
AND TOTAL SHIPMENTS

<u>Year</u>	<u>Hewlett Packard</u>	<u>C5 Ratio</u>	<u>C10 Ratio</u>	<u>Total Estimated Shipments</u>
1987	58.12%	87.83%	100.00%	411,845
1988	61.66%	87.31%	99.28%	646,097
1989	49.68%	87.48%	98.47%	991,331
1990	54.89%	78.39%	87.44%	1,925,152
1991	48.80%	76.59%	90.13%	2,687,110
1992	50.58%	80.17%	92.89%	2,303,355
1993	57.08%	82.36%	92.92%	2,303,990
1994	55.88%	80.49%	94.42%	2,795,232
1995	60.53%	85.95%	99.62%	2,814,688

TABLE 1B: NUMBER OF YEARS IN
TOP TEN IN SHIPMENTS

<u>Firm</u>	<u>Years</u>
HEWLETT-PACKARD_COMPANY	9
IBM/LEXMARK	9
DIGITAL_EQUIPMENT_CORP	8
PANASONIC/MATSUSHITA	8
APPLE_COMPUTER_CO	7
OKIDATA_CORP	7
TEXAS_INSTRUMENTS_INC	7
EPSON_AMERICA_INC	6
NEC_TECHNOLOGIES_INC	6
KYOCERA_UNISON	5
CANON	4
QMS_INC	4
XEROX_CORP	3
BROTHER_INTERNATIONAL_CORP	2
C-TECH_ELECTRONICS_INC	1
FUJITSU_AMERICA_INC	1
GCC_TECHNOLOGIES_INC	1
SUN_MICROSYSTEMS	1
TANDY_CORP	1

TABLE 2: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS

MODEL AGE	The age of the product, measured as the number of years since introduction.
HP-PCL, POSTSCRIPT	Dummy variables for printing standards.
MODEL AWARD and FIRM AWARD	One measure of product quality is to examine whether the printer has won an award for price and performance. Every year, PC Magazine announces 4-10 printer awards for printers that they judge to be particularly good value across the spectrum of printers available, based on features and predicted reliability. MODEL AWARD equals one if the particular model won an award. FIRM AWARD equals one for all models manufactured by a firm if any of its models won an award in the prior two years.
REBRAND	Dummy variable for whether the product is made by another firm and then just rebranded.
DPI	The log of the printer's resolution, measured in dots per inch.
PPM and PPM-squared	The speed of the printer, measured in pages per minute, and its square.
PRICE	List price of the printer.
HEDONIC RESIDUAL	The value of the residual from the hedonic regression.
DOMINANT FIRM	A dummy variable for whether the vendor was one of the top ten producers in terms of market share for the given year.
UNITS	Number of units shipped in the given year by the firm.
CUMULATIVE UNITS	Total number of units shipped by the firm during the previous and given year.
HP, IBM, DEC, CANON, XEROX	Dummy variable for the individual firms
OWN ALL MODELS	The number of total models the firm currently has in the desktop printer market.
OWN NICHE MODELS	The number of models the firm currently has in the focal class.
ENGINE MANF	Dummy variable for engine manufacturer.
TOTAL MODELS	The number of total models in the desktop laser printer market at the time.
PUBLIC FIRM	Dummy variable for publicly traded company
FORTUNE 1000	Dummy variable for Fortune 1000 company or equivalent (if foreign)
SAME DPI and SAME PPM:	The number of products that are at the same DPI (all classes covering the same DPI), and the number of products that are at the same PPM (all classes covering the same PPM).
SAME NICHE and SAME NICHE ²	The number of products competing in the same local PPM-DPI class as the product under consideration, and its square, respectively.
INK JET PRICE	The average price of ink jet printers in year t.
PC SALES	The number of personal computers sold in the United States in millions in year t.
PATENTS	The number of new patents issued, by application year, in patent classes 271, 355, 359, and 395.
REPLACEMENT	Dummy variable for whether the firm introduced a new printer model in the class in year t.
NICHE DEMAND	Number of units shipped in a given niche in year t.
INSTALLED BASE	Number of unites shipped in the previous three years by a given firm.
ENGINEERING WAGE	The average wage of a Level 4 engineer (as defined by the Bureau of Labor Statistics) in year t.
LAG OF ENTRY	The lag of the count of products of a firm's entry in the class

TABLE 3: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

VARIABLE	<u>MEAN</u>	<u>STD DEV</u>	<u>MIN</u>	<u>MAX</u>
MODEL AGE	2.98	1.85	1.00	11.00
POSTSCRIPT	0.46	0.50	0.00	1.00
HP-PCL	0.82	0.38	0.00	1.00
MODEL AWARD	0.11	0.32	0.00	1.00
REBRAND	0.08	0.28	0.00	1.00
Ln(DPI)	5.97	0.41	5.48	7.50
PPM	7.86	2.42	2.00	12.00
PPM ²	67.62	38.17	4.00	144.00
PRICE	22.15	18.02	1.40	165.02
HEDONIC RESIDUAL	0.00	0.31	-1.16	1.71
DOMINANT FIRM	0.38	0.49	0.00	1.00
HP	0.04	0.20	0.00	1.00
IBM	0.08	0.27	0.00	1.00
DEC	0.03	0.18	0.00	1.00
XEROX	0.03	0.16	0.00	1.00
CANON	0.03	0.17	0.00	1.00
OWN NICHE MODELS	2.87	2.01	1.00	9.00
OWN ALL MODELS	11.24	10.25	0.00	48.00
FIRM AWARD	0.30	0.46	0.00	1.00
ENGINE MANF	0.36	0.48	0.00	1.00
FORTUNE 1000	0.49	0.50	0.00	1.00
PUBLIC FIRM	0.59	0.49	0.00	1.00
PC SALES	15.52	4.45	6.80	22.60
INK JET PRICE	3.11	2.09	1.53	12.55
TOTAL MODELS	403.85	119.24	1.00	502.00
SAME PPM	60.75	29.03	1.00	108.00
SAME DPI	208.15	95.81	1.00	320.00
SAME NICHE	19.45	10.76	1.00	66.00
PATENTS	290.59	1,016.52	0.00	5,602.00
REPLACEMENT	0.39	0.49	0.00	1.00
NICHE DEMAND	282,713.40	321,752.20	0.00	1,010,626.00

TABLE 4: OPERATIONALIZATION AND OUTCOMES OF TESTS OF HYPOTHESES

<u>Hypothesis</u>	<u>Variable</u>	<u>Model</u>	<u>Expected Magnitude</u>	<u>Results</u>	
				<u>Actual Magnitude</u>	<u>Substantive Impact</u>
H1: Competition and Exit	TOTAL MODELS	Hazard Rate	> 1	> 1	Large
	SAME NICHE	Hazard Rate	> 1	> 1	Large
	SAME NICHE²	Hazard Rate	< 1	< 1	Moderate
H2: Competition and Entry	SAME NICHE	Negative Binomial	< 1	> 1	Moderate
	SAME NICHE²	Negative Binomial	< 1	< 1	Moderate
H3: Economies of Scale	DOMINANT IN YEAR	Hazard Rate	<1	<1	Large
H4: Innovative Products	DPI	Hazard Rate	< 1	<1	Large
	PPM	Hazard Rate	> 1	nss	
	PPM-SQUARED	Hazard Rate	< 1	nss	
H5: Product Portfolio: Innovation	PATENTS	Negative Binomial	> 1	> 1	Large
H6: Product Portfolio: Brands	HP, IBM, Canon, DEC, Xerox	Hazard Rate	< 1	< 1	Large

Notes: NSS = not statistically significant. > 1 means that the hazard ratio or the incidence ratio is expected to be greater than one; < 1 means that the hazard ratio or incidence ratio is expected to be less than 1. Bolded hypotheses are broadly confirmed by the data, except for parts of Hypothesis 4 and with complexity as described in the paper regarding Hypothesis 2. The results do not constitute a "test" of H5 and 6, but provide descriptive data which is consistent with these hypotheses, as noted above. The magnitude and bolding are based on the magnitude and statistical significance of the coefficients for Models 1-5 (exit) and 6-9 (entry). Substantive impact is subjective, based on magnitude of coefficients.

TABLE 5: HAZARD RATE MODELS FOR PRODUCT EXIT

<u>VARIABLE</u>	<u>MODEL 1</u> Hazard Ratio (Robust SE)	<u>MODEL 2</u> Hazard Ratio (Robust SE)	<u>MODEL 3</u> Hazard Ratio (Robust SE)	<u>MODEL 4</u> Hazard Ratio (Robust SE)	<u>MODEL 5</u> Hazard Ratio (Robust SE)	<u>MODEL 6</u> Hazard Ratio (Robust SE)
MODEL AGE	1.476*** (0.047)	1.230*** (0.039)	1.230*** (0.039)	1.217*** (0.038)	1.208*** (0.037)	1.185*** (0.041)
POSTSCRIPT	0.945 (0.131)	0.889 (0.113)	0.889 (0.112)	0.890 (0.112)	0.909 (0.113)	0.916 (0.126)
HP-PCL	1.029 (0.221)	0.854 (0.149)	0.853 (0.149)	0.854 (0.146)	0.881 (0.148)	0.765 (0.133)
MODEL AWARD	0.685** (0.125)	0.775* (0.116)	0.775* (0.116)	0.765* (0.114)	0.763* (0.111)	0.766* (0.111)
REBRAND	1.334 (0.255)	1.084 (0.182)	1.083 (0.182)	1.095 (0.187)	1.003 (0.170)	1.084 (0.195)
Ln(DPI)	2.255*** (0.430)	0.381*** (0.119)	0.381*** (0.119)	0.376*** (0.118)	0.487** (0.151)	0.563* (0.182)
PPM	0.938 (0.128)	1.211 (0.236)	1.211 (0.235)	1.187 (0.231)	1.042 (0.204)	1.049 (0.213)
PPM ²	1.008 (0.009)	0.992 (0.013)	0.992 (0.013)	0.993 (0.013)	1.002 (0.013)	1.001 (0.013)
PRICE	0.980** (0.008)	1.001 (0.006)	1.001 (0.006)	1.001 (0.006)	1.000 (0.006)	1.006 (0.006)
HEDONIC RESIDUAL	1.847*** (0.382)	1.448** (0.253)	1.448** (0.253)	1.448** (0.249)	1.411** (0.242)	1.195 (0.220)
DOMINANT IN YEAR	0.578*** (0.098)	0.690** (0.114)	0.691** (0.115)	0.692** (0.114)	0.679** (0.112)	0.691** (0.128)
HP	0.781 (0.244)	0.662 (0.195)	0.658 (0.195)	0.693 (0.204)	0.641 (0.187)	0.656 (0.204)
IBM	0.203*** (0.092)	0.416** (0.169)	0.396* (0.209)	0.441 (0.235)	0.426* (0.218)	0.502 (0.294)
DEC	0.330*** (0.089)	0.431*** (0.123)	0.430*** (0.123)	0.438*** (0.124)	0.415*** (0.116)	0.464*** (0.136)
XEROX	0.406* (0.218)	0.547 (0.249)	0.522 (0.300)	0.607 (0.363)	0.601 (0.356)	0.529 (0.360)
CANON	0.857 (0.264)	0.821 (0.222)	0.761 (0.419)	0.845 (0.481)	0.837 (0.460)	1.035 (0.598)
OWN NICHE MODELS	0.978 (0.034)	0.979 (0.031)	0.979 (0.030)	0.992 (0.032)	0.988 (0.032)	1.003 (0.036)
OWN ALL MODELS	1.056*** (0.011)	1.025*** (0.010)	1.025*** (0.010)	1.022** (0.010)	1.023** (0.010)	1.019* (0.011)
FIRM AWARD	0.542*** (0.104)	0.848 (0.140)	0.847 (0.140)	0.872 (0.147)	0.891 (0.147)	1.024 (0.174)
ENGINE MANF	1.074 (0.196)	0.993 (0.145)	0.992 (0.147)	1.018 (0.143)	0.983 (0.132)	1.048 (0.152)
FORTUNE 1000	1.413* (0.286)	1.042 (0.155)	1.037 (0.157)	1.006 (0.145)	1.026 (0.148)	1.132 (0.183)
PUBLIC FIRM	1.258	1.200	1.194	1.242*	1.193	1.278*

	(0.177)	(0.136)	(0.152)	(0.159)	(0.149)	(0.181)
PC SALES	0.928*** (0.022)	0.727*** (0.046)	0.727*** (0.046)	0.726*** (0.045)	0.724*** (0.045)	0.571*** (0.060)
INK JET PRICE	0.270*** (0.057)	0.634 (0.303)	0.634 (0.303)	0.633 (0.300)	0.626 (0.288)	1.945** (0.594)
TOTAL MODELS		1.023*** (0.005)	1.023*** (0.005)	1.023*** (0.005)	1.022*** (0.004)	1.037*** (0.007)
SAME PPM		0.994 (0.004)	0.994* (0.004)	0.994 (0.004)	0.992* (0.004)	0.992** (0.004)
SAME DPI		0.991*** (0.002)	0.991*** (0.002)	0.991*** (0.002)	0.991*** (0.002)	0.991*** (0.003)
SAME NICHE		1.086*** (0.022)	1.085*** (0.022)	1.088*** (0.023)	1.090*** (0.025)	1.072*** (0.028)
SAME NICHE ²		0.999***	0.999*** (0.000)	0.999*** (0.000)	0.999** (0.000)	0.999 (0.000)
PATENTS			1.000 (0.000)	1.000 (0.000)	1.000 (0.000)	1.000 (0.000)
REPLACEMENT				0.826 (0.136)	0.908 (0.152)	0.822 (0.150)
NICHE DEMAND					1.000*** (0.000)	1.000*** (0.000)
INSTALL BASE						0.842 (0.144)
n	1446	1446	1446	1446	1446	1446
Log pseudo-likelihood	-198.13	-144.54	-144.53	-144.09	-140.60	-140.30

Notes: All coefficients are hazard ratios, and reflect a multiplier of the hazard rate. A hazard ratio > 1 is equated to a positive coefficient in the hazard rate model; a hazard ratio of < 1 is equated to a negative coefficient in the hazard rate model. For example, a coefficient of 1.021 means that for every one unit increase in the independent variable, there is a 2.1% increase in the hazard rate. A coefficient of 0.846 means that for every one unit increase in the independent variable, there is a 15.4% decrease in the hazard rate. All t-statistics for the hazard ratios are in parentheses. *** 99% level of significance; ** 95% level of significance; * 90% level of significance.

TABLE 6: NEGATIVE BINOMIAL FOR ENTRY

<u>VARIABLE</u>	<u>MODEL 7</u> Incidence ratio (SE)	<u>MODEL 8</u> Incidence ratio (SE)	<u>MODEL 9</u> Incidence ratio (SE)	<u>MODEL 10</u> Incidence ratio (SE)
PC SALES	0.891*** (0.017)	0.873*** (0.019)	0.878 (0.131)	0.899 (0.146)
FIRM AWARD	2.250*** (0.607)	1.993*** (0.497)	1.958*** (0.458)	1.926*** (0.434)
ENGINE MANF	1.297 (0.261)	1.245 (0.271)	1.327 (0.292)	1.340 (0.295)
HP	1.848** (0.529)	1.290 (0.374)	1.267 (0.346)	1.330 (0.343)
IBM	2.358*** (0.401)	0.279*** (0.134)	0.286*** (0.128)	0.311*** (0.127)
DEC	1.404*** (0.169)	1.026 (0.152)	0.812 (0.119)	0.793* (0.114)
XEROX	3.043*** (0.541)	0.146** (0.110)	0.167** (0.119)	0.166** (0.116)
CANON	1.355** (0.208)	0.015*** (0.017)	0.013*** (0.014)	0.015*** (0.016)
DOMINANT FIRM	0.979 (0.144)	0.886 (0.128)	0.886 (0.132)	0.901 (0.137)
LAG OF ENTRY	4.024*** (1.047)	3.471*** (1.106)	2.770*** (0.743)	2.702*** (0.739)
ENGINEERING WAGE	1.039*** (0.010)	1.048*** (0.010)	1.052 (0.062)	1.047 (0.068)
SAME NICHE	1.076*** (0.017)	1.072*** (0.017)	1.065*** (0.017)	1.031* (0.020)
SAME NICHE ²	0.999*** (0.000)	0.999*** (0.000)	0.999*** (0.000)	0.999* (0.000)
PATENTS		1.001*** (0.000)	1.001*** (0.000)	1.001*** (0.000)
NICHE DEMAND				1.000*** (0.000)
Year Fixed Effects	no	no	yes	yes
Class Fixed Effects	no	no	yes	yes
alpha	8.835 (1.304)	7.471 (1.271)	6.111 (1.092)	5.872 (1.056)
Obs	9,844	9,844	9,844	9,844
Log pseudo-likelihood	-1538.10	-1497.27	-1452.18	-1444.28

Notes: All coefficients are incidence ratios, and reflect a multiplier of the original coefficients. An incidence ratio > 1 is equated to a positive coefficient in the negative binomial model; an incidence ratio of < 1 is equated to a negative coefficient in the negative binomial model. For example, a coefficient of 1.021 means that for every one unit increase in the independent variable, there is a 2.1% increase in the rate of entry. A coefficient of 0.846 means that for every one unit increase in the independent variable, there is a 15.4% decrease in the rate of entry. All t-statistics for the incidence ratios are in parentheses. *** 99% level of significance; ** 95% level of significance; * 90% level of significance.

TABLE 7: GOOD VS. EXITING FIRMS

<u>VARIABLE</u>	<u>"GOOD FIRM"</u>		<u>"EXITING FIRM"</u>	
	<u>Mean</u>	<u>Std. Dev</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>Std. Dev</u>
AVERAGE MODEL AGE	2.67	1.92	2.06	1.66
POSTSCRIPT	0.49	0.50	0.37	0.49
HPPCL	0.80	0.40	0.57	0.50
PRICE	23.21	17.98	37.47	33.02
DOMINANT FIRM	0.16	0.37	0.00	0.00
FIRM AWARD	0.20	0.40	0.03	0.17
PATENTS	785.64	2,223.63	171.22	943.01